AAR Tobruk Easter Battle,13th April 1941 - Rapid Fire Rules

For the 80th anniversary of the Tobruk Easter battle, TSOG ran a re-fight on 26th April 2021. Much of the background and OOB was similar to the 75th anniversary re-fight in 2016...

TSOG Easter Battles 2016 AAR

Prelude

Elements of the DAK 5th Light Division (8th MG Battalion [Obserst Ponath], 5th Pz Regt [Oberst Olbrich]) were ordered by Rommel to breach the Tobruk perimeter at a perceived weak point on the southern edge, and push through to the port. The fortress would fall as morale collapsed from the perimeter breach, as had occurred to Tobruk and Bardia when captured by the Australians a few months before.

Rommel's intelligence was minimal to support this attack, with two copies of Italian maps of the fortifications only made available just before the attack and no preminary reconnaissance. Allied ships had been seen in the harbour and Rommel assumed the garrison were evacuating, rather than being re-inforced as was actually the case, and he could take the fortress 'off the march' as his very successful first offensive "Sonnenblume" from February had taken him to the gates of Tobruk.

The attack fell on the Australian 9th Division, 20th Brigade, 2/17th Battalions [Lt Col Crawford] sector, particularly B Company (Capt Balfe) in the Red Line at the outer perimeter, slightly west of the El Adem Road. The preliminaries are well described in the references [1-4] below. After some probing attacks in previous days, a breach in the AT ditch was achieved on 12th April between outposts R33 and R35 by 8th MG Battalion, with R33 being overrun.

There were aggressive night counterattacks by B Company 2/17th, particularly by Lt Mackells platoon (resulting in a posthumous VC for Cpl Jack Edmonson), driving 8th MG Btn out of R33. This left a bridgehead of line/rifle Kompanies 2 & 3 of 8th MG Battalion exposed in the Red Line between posts R33 and R 35 at the front, and R32 and R34 at the back. Along this bridgehead before sunrise, the very reduced strength 5th Pz Regt (I & II battalion, totalling 38 tanks) drove towards the track at the back of the Red Line with tank riders from 5th (motorcycle) Kompanie 8th MG Btn and towing some battalion AT guns. Fire from the outposts drove the tank riders to cover in 'Goschens House' and surrounding trenches just behind R32, on the north side of the track behind the Red Line.

The 5th Pz Regt after losing its 5th Kompanie tank riders was reforming to the east of Goschens House and readying to advance north towardsthe Kings Cross intersection and Tobruk harbour. They were unaware of the Blue Line of UK and Australian AT guns blocking their path, which would possibly require the assistance of 8th MG battalion to clear. They were also unaware of armour, AT and infantry re-inforcement approaching from both flanks, hurriedly moving into position in response to the breach of the Red Line.

The 4th ('Schwere' - heavy) Kompanie of 8th MG Btn were taking cover from accurate rifle fire in the AT ditch to the right of the breach/gap. To the left of the gap in the AT ditch, or behind it, were the 20mm and 88m AA guns of the 1st Battalion, 18th Flak Regt, most of their crews shot down by D Company 2/17th during the night counterattacks and replacement crews lying prone in no-mans land. Three more Kompanies (1st line/rifle, 7th AT and 6th Pioneers) were waiting to cross no-mans land, possibly in the face of indirect artillery fire from 104 RHA behind the Blue Line.

This set the scene for the engagement near sunrise 0530 on the 13th April 1941, with the forces intermingled and already in contact as visibility increased.

Game Mechanics
Rule Set = Rapid Fire 2 with local mods.
Scale 1" = 50m,
Each Turn = 30-45 Mins, 
1 infantry fig = 15 men, 1 AFV model = 5 AFVs, 1 transport model = 10 vehicles, 1 AT/Arty model = 5 pieces.

Victory conditions depended on the possession of 5 control points (see 2016 AAR) along the line from the AT ditch gap to a point in the Blue Line, heading to Kings Cross. The game commenced with Western Desert Force controlling 3 points and DAK controlling 2, hence a marginal Allied victory.

The DAK were controlled by Pete, Allied Blue Line guns and flanking armour, AT reinforcements by George, and the Red Line Infantry and flanking infantry reinforcements by Maurice, with umpiring by Dave.

The 75th anniversary engagement in 2016 was virtually impossible for the DAK to win with the initial conditions, force mix, allied reinforcement schedule and other variables. So within the bounds of historical possibility and in the light of extra new information [1], some changes were made;
* DAK were given the first move. In the 2016 game, the first turn was diced for and the Allies won, decimating the Kompanies trapped in the Red Line before they fire a shot.
* The 5th Pz Regt did not have to advance to the north in the first two moves without infantry, as Olbrich's actual actions were. So the DAK player could reverse Olbrich's decision and pick up 5th Kompanie for the advance north.
* Historically [Ref 1] the 5th Pz Regt left it's light and command PzKW IIs behind. Hence the PzII models within each battalion were replaced by PzIII (short barrel) and the Regt HQ was placed in the 1st battalion HQ section. Instead of each battalion being composed of a single unit of models, each was composed of 2 Kompanies of two models (~10 vehicles) each. This made the battalions less brittle against morale checks than 2016 (e.g. a heavy damage to one model could force an entire battalion to retreat, but in this game only one Kompanie might retreat).
* From Ref [1] the 8th MG Btn line Kompanies 1,2, & 3 were well supplied with MMGs, light mortars and AT Rifles (i.e. 'all tooled up'). In the 2016 game these were basically just rifle Kompanies with generic small arms capability, and unable to compete in the firefights with the well entrenched outposts and UK armour in the reinforcements, particularly HMG armed MkVI light tanks.
* From Ref [1] , the 5th Kompanie was well supplied with LMGs and hence a had a +2 firing bonus on the die roll. 5th Komp was 3 figures (45 men) down from full strength, having taken considerable losses as tank-riders.
* The bridgehead Kompanies 2 and 3 were not as reduced by the night actions as 2016, being only 2 figures (30 men) down from full strength (8 figures = 120 men).
* Unlike 2016, the 8th MG battalion had the possibility of three additional Kompanies, one per turn, running the gauntlet of artillery fire in no-mans land to reach the gap in the AT ditch.
* The Allied reinforcements on their left flank, 3 squadrons of 1 RTR under Maj Benzies, and B Company AUS 2/3 AT Regt (portee 2 pounders) were forced to enter a bit further north than 2016 and the armour couldn't roll for entry till turn 2. This was to lessen the likelihood that the armour would massacre the 8th MG Kompanie bridgehead in the Red Line as C company MkVIs did in 2016, and which did not occur historically as 1RTR was supposed to engage the panzers.

References
[1] World at War (Strategy & Tactics Press) #64 Feb-Mar 2019, PP16-19.
[2] Desert Siege, by Chester Wilmot, Penguin 1944, Chapter VIII.
[3] Das Afrika Korp, by Franz Kurowski, Stackpole Books 2010, PP44-50.
[4] Tobruk 1941, by Timothy Hall, Octopus 1984, PP68-76.

After Action Report

0530: DAK commenced hostilities with 5th Pz Regt moving immediately "Vorwarts!" as per the historical orders of Olbrich, without waiting to pick up tank riders from 5th Kompanie in Goschen's House.  This was to advance towards the victory objective control points in the north as fast as possible, before the line of advance was blocked by Allied reinforcements, which would surely appear soon. The infantry were left to try and keep the gap open to flow through which reinforcements could pass.

Kompanies 2 & 3, lying prone in the gap, commenced a firefight with the outposts in the Red Line, supported by 4th Schwere Kompanie from the AT ditch, with 81cm mortars, 75mm IGs and PaK 36s firing HE, inflicting a few casualties on the well entrenched D company 2/17th. The flak guns were not successfully re-crewed (a common occurrence in the game) as they remained pinned in no-mans land. The reserve 1st Kompanie made it across no-mans land to the entrance of the AT ditch gap.

The Red Line infantry reserves, 2/17 B company, 2/17 Battalion HQ and D Company of the 20 Brigade Reserve 2/15th Battalion, began to move in vehicles towards Goschen's House with the purpose of re-capturing it and pushing the control level to an Allied Substantive Victory early in the game, putting pressure on the DAK to re-capture it, or post R32, or the point in front of the Blue Line.

Artillery spotters in the Rad Line fortifications for off-board 104 RHA 25 pounders began to get the range of targets in the Red Line, AT ditch and no-mans land beyond.

0615: Allied mobile reserves began filtering through the friendly minefields next to the El Adem Road, from the north, the right flank of 5th Panzer Regt. The faster A9 and A10 cruiser tanks of 1 RTR A Squadron, and Mk VIIs of C Squadron were ahead of the slower but  more anticipated Matildas of B Squadron. Assistance also came from B Company 2/3 AUS AT Regt with captured Italian 37mm / 47mm guns porteed on trucks. The opening salvoes of a running firefight with 5th Pz Regt commenced. More reinforcement were also appearing from the south, left of 5th Pa Regt, porteed 2pdr AT guns of M battery 3 RHA and captured Italian M13/40 tanks crewed by C Company 2/3 AUS AT Regt. Heavy German fire from the AT ditch caused heavy casualties in posts R35 and R32. R32 was a control point and obvious DAK objective for reserve Kompanie 1/8 as it negotiated the AT ditch into the Red Line. The 88mm and 20mm guns of 1st Bn 18 Flak Regt were unable to be re-crewed by gunners lying prone in no-mans land, luckily for post R33 with Lt Mackell and diggers from D Company 2/17th Btn.

The 25 pounders from the 104 RHA with indirect fire guided by spotters in the Red Line forts, caused the virtual annihilation of 2nd and 3rd Kompanies of 8th MG Battalion as they lay prone in the open in the Red Line.

0700: The Allied infantry reserves from the south dis-embarked from transport outside 300m short range small arms fire from 5th Kompanie in and around Goschen's house and formed up for a close assault. Further reinforcements from the south, C company 2/17th Btn drove north into the Red Line and disembarked to move towards R32 before DAK reinforcements could capture and turn over the control point.

5th Pz Regt moving at full speed and not being delayed by the Allied armour and AT
reinforcements threatening their flanks, had pushed close the un-anticipated AT units and
fortifications of the Blue Line. So far they had not suffered undue losses and had captured
the control point at the rocky outcrop, just short of the Blue Line. Hence 2 Allied control points
(R32, NE corner of Blue Line) vs 3 DAK (AT ditch breach, Goschen’s House, rocky outcrop
just south of Blue Line) made it momentarily an Axis marginal victory.

Allied AT fire from the Blue Line had so far been desultory and ineffective in damaging 5th Pz Regt, and the armour and porteed AT gunbs were not much more effective. The Blue Line had more luck laying suppressing fire on Goschen’s House, softening up 5th Kompanie and 8th MG Btn HQ, for the infantry assault.

0745:  After suffering casualties from small arms fire of 5th Kompnaie and 8th MG Btn HQ in Goschen’s House, the D Company 2/15th and B Company 2/17th, backed by Lt Col Crawford’s 2/17 Btn HQ, fixed bayonets and charged. Having numerical superiority, they forced the DAK from the house and surrounding trenches, claiming the control point. So 3 Allied control points to 2 DAK made it momentarily an Allied marginal victory and a very see-saw engagement.


Some light and heavy damage was being cause to 5th Pz Regt by the Allied mobile
armour and AT reserves and a tactical retreat was made from the control point near
the Blue Line, ceding it again the Allies.


0830: The reserves of C Company 2/17th had re-crewed post R32. However, further 8th MG
Btn reserves had filtered through no-man’s land to the breach in the AT ditch, including
the 6th Pioneer Kompanie and they proceeded to assault R32 with flamethrowers causing
heavy casualties but not capturing it and turning over the control point. Forward elements
of 6th Kompanie then began advancing towards Goschen’s House and inflicting casualties with
the flame throwers and small arms fire.


Meanwhile, close to the Blue Line, 5th Pz Regt remnants re-grouped into a tight phalanx and
advanced towards the rocky outcrop control point, re-capturing it, and destroying the unit
of porteed guns of B Company 2/3 AUS AT Regt defending it.  However they were being
engaged at short range by 1 RTR cruisers and MkVI tanks and at medium range from the rear
by the delayed Matildas of B Squadron, with significant loss of vehicles. On the left flank of 5th
Pz Regt a long range duel with Allied mobile reserves had not gone well for M Battery 3 RHA
with all their porteed 2 pounders being destroyed and the M13/40 of 2/3 AUS AT Regt sheltering
behind a rocky outcrop.



Play was called on account of the late hour at this point. The Allies held 3 control points (R32 just,  Goschen's House possibly about to be captured by 6th Kompanie, and the NE corner of Blue Line) and the DAK held 3 (AT ditch breach and the rocky outcrop just in front just south of the Blue Line) which made the game an Allied marginal victory.  However the Axis ended in a stronger position than their historical one, with a mauled 5th Pz Regt poised in front of the Blue Line and not in retreat, and the breach in the Red Line being exploited by 8th MG Btn despite heavy losses to their first wave. If Rommel's famous 'Fingerspuhl' battlefield intuition is working, he may sense a breakthrough and pour more units into the breach.

Fun was had by all...especially the 25Ilber Gun Crews!

Posted by Captain Darling for Oberst Heudegg...

A Hot Day’s Work AAR - Great Escape Games 1914 Rules

A Hot Day’s Work

Battle of the Geisterwald, 5th October 1916 Northern Balkans

A scenario for Great Escape Games 1914 Rules (seriously mucked about with by TSOG)

German/Bulgarian OOB

Russian OOB

Action Report from General Bolt to his direct superior General Feldburger

General Feldburger

Army of the Balkans

6^th October 1916

 

General

Following the withdrawal of the army eastward from the 3^rd onwards the 4^th Division was ordered to cover the withdrawal to the Bucsum River. Engineer units reported to me early on the 5^th that the covering Division lacked the means to destroy the crossings.

Though understrength and in need of relief I ordered the Division to the Bucsum crossings at Ósinka near the Geisterwald forest in order to hold them until such other orders were received.

As the 1^st Bavarian Regiment approached the northern crossing, they reported a train drawing into Ósinka. In response, enemy artillery opened up ineffectually on the railway station. As the 1^stBavarians started to cross the bridge, they reported several batteries of enemy artillery cresting the large hill to the right front. The batteries quickly unlimbered and commenced firing. 

The 1st Battalion took casualties from extremely accurate and intense fire. The bridge was an unexpected choke point. The cavalry screens went forward to determine the location of any supporting enemy. The regiment halted, uncertain as to whether the enemy was in depth across the river. Unfortunately the elite 1st battalion became pinned down on the bridge and continued to suffer from the Russian cannonade.

I sent the 2^nd Bulgarian Regiment across the lower ford and they entered the field along the southern road as the Bavarians were starting to push forward. They did not report any enemy on the southern side of the village and it was clear that the artillery were in front of the main force and totally unsupported.

A brisk firefight broke out between the Bavarians supported by the Bulgarians, and the Russian guns. I committed the Divisional artillery who unlimbered on the flat to the north of the river crossing and commenced close support to an attack on the hill line. They were aided by the Bavarian Heavy Machine Gun companies.

This attack was fiercely resisted, and the guns were fought to the muzzle. It was clear to the assaulting troops that the Russian guns were totally unsupported and, at least in the initial stages, there were no reported sightings of other enemy troops.

Three of the guns had been silenced when the Bulgarian battalion fixed bayonets and charged up the slope to clear the hill.

By this stage cavalry scouts had pushed forward on the south flank searching for the other Russians. The Bulgarian Colonel placed his machine guns strategically along the road and ordered the rest of the Regiment forward in support of the Bavarians.

Once the guns had been silenced and the ridge line secured a clear line of sight was obtained to the advancing Russians. At least two brigades of foot and possibly more had entered from the west and were advancing under the cover of the wheat fields, the forest itself, and some associated rough terrain.

 

It was also now possible to ascertain that Russian cavalry parties were advancing down the southern road. From my vantage point near the southern bridge it was not possible to determine whether these scouts were screens for the inevitable Cossacks or simply small parties of horsemen.

I ordered the second Bavarian battalion into secure positions on the west edge of the village and sent a message to the Bulgarians to continue the drive forward from the hill. A forward observation officer was sent forward to the eastern slope and commenced some accurate spotting for the divisional artillery. However, being under cover in the wheat fields the actual damage was limited. It did however slow the advance enough for the Bulgarians to advance to a better firing position.

At this stage more Russian cavalry was appearing along the southern road. I had no intelligence as to whether Russian troops were in or advancing into the Geisterwald directly the front of the village. The Bulgarian machine gun companies dug in along the edge of the southern plantation and the road. The Bavarian cavalry had taken considerable casualties while undertaking scouting duties and were stationed just behind and in support of the Bulgarians. As I was not sure of the Russian right flank composition I kept them mounted in case speed was needed.

On the right the Bulgarians had achieved their field position and commenced controlled volleys downslope at the sheltering Russians. From the elevated height the cover was not as effective, and casualties began to be inflicted.

A Russian battalion that had been sheltering in the Wheatfield amongst the haystacks advanced to effective firing range. In response one of the Bavarian machine gun units moved up in support of the Bulgarians and added their not inconsiderable firepower to the carnage that was unfolding in the valley below.

 

A second Russian battalion came forward to engage the Bulgarians and was likewise subjected to a withering fusillade. The edge of the Wheatfield was thick with Russian casualties. A supporting Russian machine gun unit fell back to the cover of the edge of the forest but was unable to provide much support.

To the south Russian infantry had advanced under cover of another Wheatfield and some rough ground to be within striking distance of the Bulgarian machine gun lines. The Cossacks charged down the road clearing one of the Bulgarian machine gun positions. However, fire from the support units drove them back to their start line.

 

Reports now arrived that at least one and possibly more Russian units were crossing the forest and making their way toward the thinly held village centre. The Bulgarians machine guns were fully committed dealing with the southern cavalry threat and the Bulgarian foot were dealing with the advancing enemy on the right flank. 

The Elite Bavarian unit had taken casualties whilst crossing the river and were dug in along the eastern village edge. I was unsure whether they would be enough to hold the advancing Russians as there was no way of telling the exact number coming through the forest.

The second Bulgarian battalion also fell back into positions in support of the Germans whilst the remaining Bavarian machine gun unit sighted themselves at the northern crossroads.

I also ordered the second Bavarian battalion back from the hill to reinforce the remnants of the first battalion in the village. The forward observation officer from the divisional artillery accompanied them.

As the Russians emerged from the Geisterwald, it was obvious that the massed firepower available for the village defence was too strong and they turned and began to disengage. Scouting groups confirmed that at least two battalions had been destroyed in the wheatfield to the right flank. The Cossacks had not suffered many casualties. However, their ability to take the entire flank with only one battalion of infantry in support was always going to be difficult. 

The Divisional artillery ineffectively harassed them as they retired.

I would like to report that we have accomplished our mission and await your further orders.

 

General Bolt

4^th Division

Army of the Balkan